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     UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
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     DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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     In re:
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                                    : Chapter 11
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     W. R. GRACE & CO., et al., : Case No. 01-01139 (KG)
 7
                                   : (Jointly Administered)
               Debtors.
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                              United States Bankruptcy Court
11
                               824 North Market Street
                              Wilmington, Delaware
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13
                              April 30, 2018
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                               3:01 p.m. - 4:12 p.m.
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21
     BEFORE:
22
     HON KEVIN GROSS
23
     U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24
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     ECRO OPERATOR: GINGER MACE
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	Page 2
1	HEARING re Maryland Casualty Company's Motion to Enforce the
2	Permanent Channeling Injunction and for Sanctions [Filed:
3	1/29/18] (Docket No. 32999).
4	
5	HEARING re Agreed Motion to Extend Maryland Casualty
6	Company's Time to File Reply Papers with Respect to Its
7	Motion to Enforce the Permanent Channeling Injunction and
8	for Sanctions [Filed: 4/17/18] (Docket No. 33022).
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25	Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde

	Page 3
1	APPEARANCES:
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20	Attorneys for Libby Mine
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25	

	Page 4
1	PROCEEDINGS
2	CLERK: Please rise.
3	THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you.
4	You may be seated.
5	MAN 1: Good afternoon.
6	THE COURT: I'm seeing a strange face in this
7	case, I know. Mr. Wisler, good afternoon.
8	MR. WISLER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jeffrey
9	Wisler, on behalf of Maryland Casualty Company. Your Honor,
10	I promise this won't take as long as last week's Patriot
11	hearing.
12	THE COURT: Good.
13	MR. WISLER: Your Honor, this is Maryland
14	Casualty's motion to enforce final orders of this Court,
15	including the permanent channeling injunction arising from
16	the confirmed plan of reorganization of W.R. Grace.
17	THE COURT: Yes.
18	MR. WISLER: Your Honor, I'd like to introduce you
19	to my co-counsel, Edward Longosz, from Eckert Seamans.
20	THE COURT: Welcome.
21	MR. WISLER: Mr. Longosz
22	THE COURT: Good to have you here.
23	MR. WISLER: and I have been involved in this
24	case since well, as long as Mr. Cohn has, actually, also.
25	THE COURT: Okay.

	Page 5
1	MR. WISLER: I may have a little bit of time on
2	both of them, but we've been involved for a long time. So,
3	with that, Your Honor, I'll turn the podium over to Mr.
4	Longosz.
5	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wisler. Thank you,
6	sir. Mr. Longosz, it's good to have you here.
7	MR. LONGOSZ: Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize,
8	over the weekend, I think my voice left me, not because I
9	was cheering for my favorite sports team, but because of the
LO	pollen.
L1	THE COURT: I understand.
L2	MR. LONGOSZ: So, that's my Mr. Wisler is here,
L3	just in case I need some reinforcements.
L4	THE COURT: We'll work through it.
L5	MR. LONGOSZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
L6	THE COURT: Yes.
L7	MR. LONGOSZ: So, Your Honor, what brings us here
L8	today and again, good afternoon, and Edward Longosz, for
L9	the record. Thank you again for accommodating us from last
20	week's rescheduling, sir.
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. LONGOSZ: We appreciate that.
23	THE COURT: I certainly understand that, Mr.
24	Longosz.
2.5	MR. LONGOSZ: So. Your Honor, we're here and

	Page 6
1	I'll hearken back to what Yogi Berra said, déjà vu all over
2	again.
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. LONGOSZ: I've been living with this case
5	since 2001, since the outset, as has other counsel here.
6	I've gone through all the various motions and reiterations
7	through Judge Fitzgerald looking at the case, making some
8	rulings on motions to enforce, clarifications, setting up
9	the injunction with respect to Maryland Casualty and other
10	insurers.
11	THE COURT: Yes.
12	MR. LONGOSZ: Also, I was here and argued the
13	motion before Judge Carey, which leads us to why we're here
14	today.
15	Your Honor, just if I could give some frame the
16	issues and give some preliminary thoughts, I know
17	THE COURT: Please do, because I'm fairly you
18	know, I'm somewhat new to the matter.
19	MR. LONGOSZ: Okay.
20	THE COURT: And it would be helpful, anything
21	any background you've got, Mr. Longosz.
22	MR. LONGOSZ: Sure. With respect to this case,
23	the case emanates out of the W.R. Grace bankruptcy,
24	obviously.
25	THE COURT: Yes.

	Page 7
1	MR. LONGOSZ: And what we have here today is only
2	one issue before the Court, and that's the motion to enforce
3	the permanent channeling injunction and order.
4	I think, and we believe, that there's only one
5	question, and that's the enforcement of the injunction. We
6	don't believe that there's any question with respect to the
7	due process aspects of it. You may have read the papers
8	something about a request for a stay based on the pending
9	THE COURT: Third Circuit, yes.
10	MR. LONGOSZ: the Third Circuit. I'll get into
11	that a little bit later and be happy to answer any questions
12	Court may have
13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	MR. LONGOSZ: relative to that. But Roberts
15	just so I can stage for Roberts and we can talk about
16	some of the other things that happened on the way up to
17	Roberts Roberts is a non-Grace non-worker employee case.
18	I think that's very, very important for purposes of our
19	discussion today.
20	Roberts falls under the no workers' compensation
21	scheme. So, Roberts is not covered by any workers'
22	compensation policy
23	THE COURT: Right.
24	MR. LONGOSZ: doesn't get the benefit of any
25	policy, none of his slaims would arise out of anything even

Page 8 1 remotely close to workers' compensation policy. The reason 2 that's important is -- as you know, and as you probably read 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 5 MR. LONGOSZ: -- Judge Carey talked about claims 6 arising out of the workers' compensation policy, and that's 7 not contained within Exhibit 5. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. LONGOSZ: Okay. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. LONGOSZ: There is no allowance, for purposes 12 of this case and for purposes of Judge Carey, and we'll talk 13 about what he found. There's no allowance for any claim by 14 a non-worker. So, this is -- Roberts, I believe, wasn't 15 even somebody you could say was remote -- it's a 16 townsperson; it's an individual that lived in Libby, Montana 17 -- may have... In Libby, Montana, just to give you some -- to 18 19 capture the essence of that section of Montana, there's mountains; Libby's in a valley. The Libby mine is a mine 20 that's up in the -- they call it Libby Mountain. The mined 21 22 the ore there. They packaged it and did some processing of 23 it. It was brought down the mine, from the mine, to the 24 railroad yard. It was loaded, and you've probably seen BNSF 25 mentioned --

	Page 9
1	THE COURT: Yes.
2	MR. LONGOSZ: through some of the papers, it
3	was loaded onto railcars and the railcars took it away to
4	its final destination or other destinations.
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. LONGOSZ: Now, there's some people that claim
7	that while the railcars were moving along the railroad,
8	people were fishing, they were hunting, they breathed the
9	asbestos as it's going along, so therefore, they would have
10	claims against the Railroad for not tarping the cars or
11	doing something relative to the cars. They would likewise
12	have claims, or would have claims, against W.R. Grace.
13	So, to give context, Mr. Roberts was not even
14	close to being any of those individuals.
15	THE COURT: Well, the claim is by Mrs. Roberts on
16	behalf of Mr. Roberts.
17	MR. LONGOSZ: Roberts, and
18	THE COURT: Is that right?
19	MR. LONGOSZ: Right. And Mr. Roberts was not a
20	worker
21	THE COURT: Right.
22	MR. LONGOSZ: not a mine worker
23	THE COURT: Right.
24	MR. LONGOSZ: not a railroad rep. Didn't have
25	anything to do with Maryland Casualty or the mine where

Page 10 1 Maryland Casualty was a workers' compensation carrier. 2 THE COURT: Exactly. And that's what Judge Carey 3 ruled, that the workers' compensation claims remained 4 viable, but non-workers' compensation claims are subject to 5 the injunction. 6 MR. LONGOSZ: Correct. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. LONGOSZ: And that's why we're here on the 9 motion to enforce. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. LONGOSZ: I think the Plaintiffs take a 12 different view of that, or -- I'm not sure what their view 13 is, other than the fact that they think they get the benefit, somehow, of the workers' compensation scheme, that 14 15 Maryland Casualty was doing work in the mine as a workers' 16 compensation carrier, so therefore, that carries over to 17 non-employees, that Judge Carey rejected. I believe he used 18 the word "rejected" that argument. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. LONGOSZ: So, the Libby claimants lost that 21 argument, did not appeal, nor did Maryland Casualty. 22 guess we were all comfortable with that decision in the 23 sense that we could go -- if claimants filed a claim on behalf of a worker in State Court, it would be a claim bad 24 25 faith for the provision of workers' comp, the delivery of

Page 11 1 workers' compensation insurance, any iteration of claim they 2 had arising out of workers' compensation program as an employee. Those cases will be fought in State Court. And 3 Judge Carey said, "to the extent that such cases even 4 5 existed", and we'll let the State Court whether that's even 6 a viable claim. 7 So, in fact, the Libby claimants, Mr. Hutt in 8 particular, has filed a State Court claim. Read something 9 about this Asbestos Claims Court. I'll talk about that a 10 little bit. 11 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LONGOSZ: But that's included within the 12 13 Asbestos Claims Court cases. It's actually set for trial in 14 February of next year. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. LONGOSZ: And we haven't gotten through 17 discovery. We haven't even gotten to the point of 18 determining, or having the Court determine, whether a viable 19 State Court claim exists for purposes of Mr. Hutt. But he 20 did file a case; it's a viable case there. The problem is 21 now Ms. Roberts has filed on behalf of her husband, a State 22 Court claim --23 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LONGOSZ: -- or hasn't dismissed the State 24 25 Court claim that was filed. And we also have another case -

Page 12 1 - well, there's many, many cases; there's hundreds of cases 2 now. But we were just in State Court last week, actually 3 the day before we were supposed to argue this, on a case called Hunt. And Hunt is another non-worker where the 4 5 Plaintiffs are continuing to pursue that case. 6 And you may have seen in their opposition, they 7 filed an adversary complaint relating to Mr. Hunt. That is 8 neither here nor there for purposes of our motion today. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 10 MR. LONGOSZ: But it's a State -- it's a non-11 worker who is proceeding with his claim in State Court, 12 notwithstanding the bar imposed by the injunction in this 13 case. 14 Now, I will -- just for full disclosure, both 15 Maryland Casualty and the Plaintiffs had alerted the State 16 Court Judge that we have this motion pending and put the 17 Court on notice. The Court -- the State Court Judge said, 18 well, that's nice, but until I see an order, you know, I'm 19 going to issue a scheduling order. And there's a scheduling 20 order there, so --21 THE COURT: Is this the one where trial is 22 scheduled for September? 23 MR. LONGOSZ: I believe --THE COURT: Or is that a different matter? 24 25 MR. LONGOSZ: That's a different matter.

Page 13 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. LONGOSZ: The trial -- Judge, there are 3 deadlines in September --4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. LONGOSZ: -- for everybody. The trial is not 6 scheduled until next February. 7 THE COURT: Okay, okay. 8 MR. LONGOSZ: But there's very, very rigorous 9 deadlines. In fact, experts are due in July. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MR. LONGOSZ: And we were just -- Maryland 12 Casualty was just amended and brought into the case and 13 served. 14 THE COURT: Okay. And this is the Roberts case? 15 MR. LONGOSZ: That was the Hunt case. 16 THE COURT: The Hunt case, we're talking about. 17 Okay. 18 MR. LONGOSZ: In Roberts, there's nothing going on 19 in State Court. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. LONGOSZ: Okay. And that's -- and the reason 22 be brought it is because it was a case reflective of a non-23 worker. It is a true non-worker traditional case, and it was a good case for this Court to look at and us to be able 24 25 to explain to the Court why the injunction applied and

	Page 14
1	should be enforced. And there are no deadlines. It was
2	with the advent of the Asbestos Claims Court, it got
3	everybody's attention
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	MR. LONGOSZ: and brought to this Court. Just
6	to give a little context to the Asbestos Claims Court,
7	apparently back in 2001 or the late 1990s, the Legislature
8	enacted a provision that allowed for the Montana Supreme
9	Court to put into effect what's called an Asbestos Claims
10	Court. Because of all these W.R. Grace cases that were
11	emanating out of, in particular, Libby, Montana.
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. LONGOSZ: And Libby, Montana probably has 2000
14	residents, 3000 residents, all of which are claiming they
15	have an asbestos-related disease. If you notice, the plan
16	the carveout for the Libby claimants
17	THE COURT: Yes.
18	MR. LONGOSZ: which they're availing themselves
19	of. The trust is there and they're availing themselves of
20	the trust proceeds. The Libby, I think, was dedicated as an
21	EPA cleanup site. It's very, very it ended up being
22	very, very bad after 70 years of mining there.
23	But that said, Grace filed bankruptcy in '01.
24	THE COURT: Yes.
25	MR. LONGOSZ: Therefore, the necessity of the

Asbestos Claims Court was not necessary, was unnecessary.

Fast forward to last year, Grace comes out of bankruptcy. A couple years ago, BNSF, International Paper, a variety of other defendants were being sued, the State of Montana, were all being sued, and the courts were being overwhelmed. The state courts were being overwhelmed, underfunded.

So, the Supreme Court in late last year decided to turn the key, so to speak, to the Asbestos Claims Court, and bring that court to life, and dedicated a District Court judge, Judge Eddy, to oversee the Asbestos Claims Court, and to bring all these vermiculite, W.R. Grace, Libby, Montana cases under its fold. I think there's probably close to 2000 claims; the last week could count, there's probably 1600, 1700 claims that are either before the Court or will be before the Court.

So, what the Court's trying to do is parse those cases.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. LONGOSZ: There's a variety of things that are going to be coming up before that Court, including whether in fact these people, these individuals, have asbestos-related disease, number one, or whether they're injured or impaired. So, there's going to be a big hearing in July relative to that. It's particularly important for the Railroad, the State of Montana, International Paper, and

Page 16 1 some of the other defendants. To wit, Maryland Casualty is 2 being sued, or being served in lawsuits that have been filed 3 that we didn't know about, weekly, monthly, with respect to cases before the Asbestos Claims Court. 4 5 Thus far, the only cases that have been brought, 6 or had been brought, worker cases, or cases that we could 7 discern might have been worker cases, or at least are in our policy period. Now what's happened is that there -- a lot 8 9 of cases are being brought in. There's no differentiation 10 or distinction between worker and non-worker cases. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 12 MR. LONGOSZ: Notwithstanding the order, Judge 13 Carey's order. And Judge, really, just -- I don't want to 14 fast-forward to the end --15 THE COURT: Is the Robert's case, is this -- is 16 the Robert's case a test case, in effect? 17 MR. LONGOSZ: It could be for the purposes of this 18 Court, yes. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. LONGOSZ: Because I think what the Court does 21 here is going to have applicability to the other cases. 22 will have applicability to the other cases because if there is a case similar to Roberts, the Plaintiffs should be -- if 23 24 the Court agrees with our position and Judge Carey's 25 position -- then those cases would be dismissed, and the

Page 17 1 Plaintiffs will have to critically look through their cases 2 to discern whether they have their worker or non-worker --3 THE COURT: Right. MR. LONGOSZ: -- whether covered by the workers' 4 5 compensation policy or not. From what we can tell -- we 6 just got this information recently -- there's probably about 7 200 to 300, maybe in that 270 zone, of cases that appear to 8 be worker cases, at least from our count, out of the 1600 or 9 so cases. So, we know that there are some cases out there 10 that have to be teased out, but this, in effect, yeah, we 11 could call this a bell weather test case. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Because you haven't brought a 13 defendant class, for example, in --14 MR. LONGOSZ: No, and we could have brought 1500 15 of these --16 THE COURT: Yeah. 17 MR. LONGOSZ: -- or 100 of these, or 200 of these. But pretty much the Plaintiffs know. And that's why the due 18 process argument doesn't really work. Everybody knows what 19 20 a worker is and does -- a worker is not. Actually, the 21 Plaintiffs know the Defendants we don't know, but they know 22 which ones are workers and non-workers. 23 So, the applicability would be there with respect They're all represented by the same Plaintiffs' 24 25 counsel in Montana.

	Page 18
1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. LONGOSZ: So, there is one other firm, the
3	Lewis firm, who was involved in the bankruptcy in this
4	court, who has some claimants. But none of those claimants,
5	curiously, have filed a lawsuit against Maryland Casualty to
6	our knowledge
7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	MR. LONGOSZ: or prosecuted one. It's only the
9	McGarvey firm, that Mr. Cohn's here today.
10	THE COURT: All right.
11	MR. LONGOSZ: Really, what we want, it's the
12	sanction part of this is to tell them to stop. Stop filing
13	cases and dismiss the cases that are not properly before the
14	State Courts. We're not sitting here saying we want lots of
15	money or lots of sanctions. I think the Court knows what
16	we're looking for in terms of the end.
17	But we had to make sure that we let the Court know
18	we take this very, very seriously. And these are, in some
19	ways, contemptuous because Judge Carey did have a very
20	defined, very direct opinion
21	THE COURT: Yes, he did.
22	MR. LONGOSZ: and order. And so, we want to
23	make sure that everybody understood the gravity of what
24	we're talking about, including Your Honor.
25	THE COURT. Abgolutoly

MR. LONGOSZ: Now, I think the Plaintiffs may claim they are between a rock and a hard spot in Roberts. Are they allowed to proceed; not allowed to proceed? The Plaintiffs never came to the Court for relief after Judge Carey's opinion. Never sought -- said, well, wait a minute, let's move to reconsider, let's appeal, or let's get further clarification of what you really meant, Judge Carey, in connection with your opinion and your order. And that never happened. But what was happening was that it was business as usual for the Plaintiffs. Now, if we could go back -- so going back in time to during the bankruptcy proceeding, recall that Judge Fitzgerald entered an order in 2002 denying Girard's motion to clarify and the scope of the preliminary injunction to modify the preliminary injunction. The Libby claimant -and what Judge Fitzgerald said is that this applies to, you know, the insurers, including Maryland Casualty and CNA -the Plaintiffs, the Libby claimants, lost that motion with Judge Fitzgerald. The Third Circuit agreed with Judge Fitzgerald. The plan was later confirmed on February 3rd, 2014. THE COURT: Yes. MR. LONGOSZ: Roberts, as a non-employee, files his suit February 25th, 2014. So, Judge Carey -- the plans

confirm that Roberts files a suit, maybe because they

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thought that there was a tolling provision they had to file within the 60 days after the plan of confirmation, based on Judge Fitzgerald's order. So, they filed that. But they initiate their DJ in October of 2014, October 21, 2014.

Judge Carey issued his opinion on October 17, 2016.

And if the Court looks at the timeline, Judge

Carey, almost a year to issue that opinion. And I say it

took him so long because he was looking at the case -
although he did say that he wished Judge Fitzgerald had not

retired --

THE COURT: Yes, I --

MR. LONGOSZ: -- during arguments. So, but that said, he took the time, the care, the consideration to look at what was going on, to look at whether these claims, or maybe some of these claims, were part of, derivative of, subject to (indiscernible) asbestos.

And in fact, Judge Carey made a very prophetic comment during the course of the proceeding, as he said to Mr. Cohn that, "Maybe I don't quite see things the way you do. Maybe I see them through a different prism." And that was prophetic because when the decision came out, Judge Carey did see things through a different prism.

Quite frankly, we were hoping that workers' compensation claims would not be allowed because we view those as statutory claims, and you could only bring a

	Page 21
1	statutory claim. But Judge Carey to do a carveout for the
2	plaintiffs
3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. LONGOSZ: based on what was before him.
5	THE COURT: I assume that's a somewhat finite
6	group of people, too, isn't it?
7	MR. LONGOSZ: It is.
8	THE COURT: Yes.
9	MR. LONGOSZ: It is.
10	THE COURT: Yeah.
11	MR. LONGOSZ: You're either a worker or you're not
12	a worker.
13	THE COURT: Right.
14	MR. LONGOSZ: Either you worked in a mine as a
15	Grace employee or not. If you were a Grace employee and
16	worked in the mine, you were covered by workers'
17	compensation
18	THE COURT: Yes.
19	MR. LONGOSZ: insurance.
20	THE COURT: Yes.
21	MR. LONGOSZ: And whatever flowed out of that, the
22	provision of workers' compensation insurance, the Libby
23	claimants could, Judge Carey said, make whatever claims you
24	want to. Now, we would argue that the only claim you could
25	make is a workers! semponsation slaim

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LONGOSZ: And for example, if you were denied, you made a workers' compensation claim, you were denied that claim and you thought there was bad faith in the denial of that, you can proceed to file that under the construct of the laws of Montana. Plaintiffs may take it, or obviously are trying to take it a step further, and say well, there should have been this industrial hygiene, there should have been all these things for the workers.

So, maybe they do have a cause of action by virtue of the provision of workers' compensation insurance. Of course, the State Court is going to have to look at that to see if there was a duty required, whether there were bundled or unbundled services, what the scope of the involvement of Maryland casualty was, was it just a workers' compensation carrier, did it provide more, or just workers' compensation benefits to W.R. Grace at the time?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LONGOSZ: I suggest to the Court they did not, but that's for another day, another court.

THE COURT: Another court, yes.

MR. LONGOSZ: Right. But unless you're a worker and you get the benefit of that policy, you don't have a ground to stand on for purposes of bringing an action. And that's why Judge Carey was so careful in his language and

his opinion.

The Plaintiffs were trying to suggest, and they were trying to push beyond the edges of just workers' compensation, and they talked about things like negligence and things of that nature. And Judge Carey brought that back and said, no, no, no. You can't just bring this wholesale negligence action because that would be channeled into the channeling injunction, and you can't bring those.

The reason Plaintiffs were trying to do that is because they wanted to expand the scope of that declaratory judgment action. Because I guarantee what they would've been doing is saying, ah, Judge Carey allowed those, so therefore I can add my 1600 claims on behalf of non-workers that are clearly not channeled. And that, as Judge Carey said, was absolutely wrong --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LONGOSZ: -- and was not correct. The funny thing is -- and I hate to say that -- it's colloquial, the funny thing is -- the Plaintiffs chose to appeal the CNA case.

THE COURT: Right,

MR. LONGOSZ: And the first part of our case, the Maryland Casualty case, was almost for a very, very similar grounds. You know, Judge Carey found the same as he did for CNA.

	Page 24
1	THE COURT: Yes.
2	MR. LONGOSZ: Why didn't the Plaintiff appeal?
3	Only they know for sure. But what we're left with is a
4	final order in this case. And whatever the Third Circuit
5	may or may not do at any other time is of no consequence and
6	no moment to this case because we have a final order that
7	needs to be implemented and enforced. And in fact
8	THE COURT: But if the Third Circuit goes against
9	you on the appeal
10	MR. LONGOSZ: If it does?
11	THE COURT: and it does wouldn't that have
12	an impact here too?
13	MR. LONGOSZ: Well I thought my counsel was
14	sending me a note
15	THE COURT: Oh, oh. You thought he was going to
16	save you. No, but
17	MR. LONGOSZ: The lifeline.
18	THE COURT: Wouldn't that have an effect?
19	MR. LONGOSZ: What do you mean by goes against me?
20	Here's the problem. The issues with respect to the Third
21	Circuit can do a variety of things. The real issue before
22	the Third Circuit right now is CNA prevailed on those issues
23	relating to the negligence components.
24	THE COURT: Yes,
25	MR. LONGOSZ: And CNA also prevailed because the

workers' comp policy was covered under Exhibit 5. And it
was a very lively argument. I don't know if counsel
provided the argument or a copy of the argument, the Third
Circuit argument; we can certainly provide that to the
Court. But I think the only thing we would get out of it is
perhaps a dicta that would not necessarily be wholesale
applicable to Maryland Casualty. Because the issues are not
Maryland Casualty issues that are teed up with respect to
the Third Circuit.

Third Circuit doesn't have the issues where Judge Carey parsed out the claims and only permitted the workers' compensation claims to go forward.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LONGOSZ: So, CNA has different arguments, a different construct before it. And maybe there's wishful thinking, maybe there's hope, maybe let's wait and see what they do, and if they -- if there's any language in there that we could come back and convince Judge Gross could weigh against Maryland Casualty, let's wait and see what happens. The problem is the appeal our case and consolidate it with the CNA case.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LONGOSZ: If they had believed in their position, they would have done that. I think the real issue there is really -- is going to see whether in fact that

Page 26 1 Exhibit 5 holds up on the CNA side. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. LONGOSZ: Pretty solid on the other arguments; 4 very, very solid on the other arguments. So, then what we have is Roberts is served in 5 6 February of 2017 and the amended complaint is filed on May 7 17, 2017, and then the Asbestos Claims Court is activated in 8 November, at the end of November 2017. That's why we filed 9 this motion, because all of a sudden, all these cases were 10 coming to a head. 11 And not to say there haven't been discussions, you know, relative to the effective -- what was the effect of 12 13 the Third Circuit, what would be the affect of a decision 14 here. There's a lot of discussion going on with the Libby 15 claimants. 16 And in fact, you know, it's interesting. A 17 question one might want to pose is that if the Third Circuit 18 affirms, does that mean that Judge Gross doesn't have to 19 make any decisions and all those cases go away except for 20 the worker cases? I guarantee you're not going to get that 21 commitment. 22 THE COURT: No. 23 MR. LONGOSZ: You're not going to get that. THE COURT: I wouldn't think so. 24 25 MR. LONGOSZ: I tried to get it and in fact

couldn't. So, to answer your question, no, the Third

Circuit, we don't be believe is going to be case dispositive

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LONGOSZ: -- anything that's before this

Court, especially when we're looking at a final order. If

in fac there is -- if there is anything to tease out of this

by Libby claimants, they're very good at pivoting, and if

Your Honor decides to enforce the injunction, as we request,

I'm sure that there is -- and the Third Circuit comes down

with a decision or opinion, there may be some sort of

equitable claim that they could make relative to that.

But it's just like -- it's like any case where you have the law as it is today, and a Third Circuit can decide, or a Fourth Circuit can decide something two, three, four years from now that could change what happened in the past. And while it's not something maybe so imminent, there was never a request -- and I find it telling there was never a request to stay Roberts when we first filed the motion. And I guess one wanted to see how the briefing went, one wanted to see how the argument went, and then maybe finally come back to Judge Gross and say, eh, could you wait and see what the Third Circuit says?

If it was so important for that Third Circuit opinion, Libby claimants, the Roberts, Roberts would have

filed a motion to stay right away.

THE COURT: Mm hmm.

MR. WISLER: In fact, we were expecting it, if in fact the Plaintiffs were so solid in their position.

Again, just to set the stage, following the Hutt
DJ action, it is our belief that all non-employees should
have been dismissed rather than -- rather, none that we know
were dismissed, but many were filed. And there could be no
more guidance than that which was provided to the parties
than what Judge Carey provided.

It's interesting that -- I'm going to go through a little bit of the argument with respect to Judge Carey's opinion. But the Plaintiff argues in their briefing, and I found it to be interesting that they said they got what they wanted; we won. You know, they lost four out of six arguments. And they lost the four arguments that would've put non-employees in the Plaintiffs' chair in State Court.

So, maybe they did get what they wanted. They were able to salvage the employee claims and be able to file workers and employees of W.R. Grace, but they didn't win the Hutt case or the Osborn case, based on Judge Carey's opinion.

So, the reason I said déjà vu all over again, the Plaintiffs have argued this, and they've argued this for the last 17 years. They argued it during plan confirmation, and

we won. They argued it before Judge Carey, and we won.

There's nothing new here with respect to this response. In fact, Plaintiff never responded substantively even to our motion, and there's a reason for that.

So, Your Honor, I'm just going to talk a little bit about our motion. I think it's been well briefed.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LONGOSZ: I think the most hard-hitting part of it -- I'd ask the Court to look at it again as our reply brief. I think our reply brief really sets it in a concise manner where we stand with respect to this.

But just to set the stage, Libby Plaintiffs Hutt and Osborn were former Grace mine employees represented by the same Montana firm, and they sought to test the limits of the channeling injunction by filing the dec action. No problem there. I think that's an appropriate way to do it.

Hutt and Osborn sought clarification as to the scope of the channeling injunction. The procedure they used correctly sought permission to file certain specific State Court claims for negligence in the provisional industrial hygiene and bad faith treatment of workers. And if you look at all these State Court claims, they all have, and they all talk about, negligence in the provision of industrial hygiene.

The problem is, they do it on behalf of non-

workers. They just think they can mix and match, they can just throw, you know, the same claims, regardless of what happened in Hutt and Osborn, so that this Court or any court could allow those claims to proceed.

Hutt and Osborn's adversary complaint contained three arguments as to why they had not yet filed a court claim at the time should be allowed to proceed outside of the channeling injunction. And this is important. The adversary counts, 1 and 4, said that 524(g) does not permit the channeling injunction to enjoin Plaintiffs' claims.

524(g) permits third-party injunction only to the extent claims alleged liability derivative of the Debtors, and that arise by specific relationship, including provision of insurance. Okay? Recall that Judge Carey rejected that argument.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LONGOSZ: Counts 2 and 4 said if the claims arise by provision of insurance, that insurance must be workers' compensation policies, which are excluded because they were not listed in Exhibit 5 of the plan. Plaintiffs prevailed on that.

Adversary counts 3 and 5 asked if claims arise by provision of insurance, such insurance must be workers' compensation policies, and coverage for workers' compensation benefits may not be channeled by 524(g)

injunction. Plaintiffs -- Judge Carey rejected that argument.

So, the only one we're left with, if the claims arise by provision of insurance, that insurance must be workers' compensation policies. And workers' compensation policies, by their very nature, can only be and include workers, which are excluded because they are not listed in Exhibit 5 to the plan. That's the only counts that Plaintiff prevailed on.

So, put another way, Judge Carey permitted the proposed claims on these narrow grounds. Part of the argument encompassed within Counts 2 and 4, was that if Plaintiffs' claims arose by provision of insurance, that insurance must be workers' compensation policies because the CGL --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LONGOSZ: -- policies excluded claims made by workers, and Plaintiffs Hutt and Osborn were workers. So, workers' compensation workers; workers' compensation covers employees; Judge Carey said not included in Exhibit 5; Maryland Casualty, too bad; you have to -- you may be responsible, based on the State Court, for employees.

I say relief, or the relief requested in Counts 2 and 4 was specifically premised on Plaintiffs' status as workers.

Now, Judge Carey rejected the broader relief, as I talked about, in Counts 1 and 4, and said that he determined that the asbestos PI channeling injunction was proper under the requirements of 524(g), and that 524(g)'s exclusion for workers' compensation benefits was only for statutory claims for benefits, not tort claims like Hutt's and Osborn's. So again, he linked it back to 2 and 4, where he permitted workers to proceed.

And just on Paragraph -- just referring the Court again to our motion to enforce, Paragraph 27 of the motion, where Judge Carey -- and I don't want to read the whole part in here, but I think it's very important. "Accordingly, I reject the Plaintiffs' arguments asserting Counts 1 and 6 that the Bankruptcy Code 524(g) limits the reach of asbestos PI channeling injunction and prevents this injunction from enjoining Plaintiffs' claims."

And Judge Carey goes on to talk about that. "But I think it's important to say Plaintiffs' claims seek to hold MCC indirectly liable for the conduct of claims against or demands of the Debtors, and those are precisely the non-employee claims. Also, MCC's provision of insurance to the Debtors is legally relevant to, or at the very least a close nexus to the Plaintiffs' claims because MCC's liability could affect erase of the Debtors' estate, determining that 524(g)(4)(A)(2) protects an insurer from claims such as the

Page 33 1 negligence claim and the bad faith claim is not beyond the 2 jurisdiction of this court." 3 THE COURT: So, what you would like me to do, 4 basically, is to somewhat narrowly apply Judge Carey's 5 ruling to the Roberts case and say the Roberts case is not a 6 workers' compensation case, and therefore, it is enjoined --7 MR. LONGOSZ: And it's not an employee case. 8 THE COURT: That's right. 9 MR. LONGOSZ: Not an employee case. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. LONGOSZ: I would love it if the Court would 12 say it's not a workers' compensation case, and we argue 13 that, and I would argue that only workers' compensation 14 cases could proceed. But in fairness, I think that is 15 certainly something we'll have to argue with respect to the 16 State Court as to what is the extent of the type of claim 17 that can emanate for a worker arising out of a workers' 18 compensation claim --19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. LONGOSZ: -- or case. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. LONGOSZ: But yes, Your Honor, it's -- if 23 you're not a worker, and you're not -- and you're not 24 covered -- if you're not a worker, you're not covered by 25 workers' compensation. Only employees are covered by

Page 34 1 workers' compensation, and only workers' compensation 2 claims, however they may be, only employees with workers' compensation claims or coverage or are entitled to the 3 provision of insurance, and therefore -- so that would be --4 5 that's the enforcement of Judge Carey's order. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. LONGOSZ: And if Judge Carey were here, we'd 8 be asking him for the same thing. 9 THE COURT: Understood. 10 MR. LONGOSZ: Your Honor, I think you -- I don't 11 want to beat the dead horse. I think it's pretty clear what we are asking for. I do believe that the form in the 12 13 enforcement motion is proper. I think we cited cases where 14 -- we wouldn't be asking for an injunction on the 15 injunction. We don't have to file another adversary 16 proceeding. I think the case law is in -- and this Court 17 certainly has the power to enforce those orders. And we're 18 asking the Court to do that. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. LONGOSZ: The stay, I think we've amply 21 indicated to the Court why the stay doesn't -- the Court 22 does not need to wait for the Third Circuit opinion. 23 does not to stay this. We're asking for enforcement of a 24 final order of this Court. The channeling injunction is -for purposes of the due process argument, is a universal --25

Page 35 1 has universal enforceability. And so, therefore, it's 2 pretty simple in terms of what we're asking for here. 3 So, there's no consolidation, there's no necessity 4 for any kind of consolidation, there's no necessity for 5 coming back to the Court and refiling this with some 6 procedural fix that the Plaintiffs are suggesting --7 actually, they haven't really suggested one other than they 8 would accept service on behalf of all those people that are 9 non-employees. So, we don't know who they are. They 10 suggest we should give them names. How do we know? We 11 haven't followed the cases. But what the Court does here in 12 Roberts, I think is going to have a pronounced effect and 13 universal effect on what happens with respect to the non-14 worker cases. 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. LONGOSZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Longosz. Mr. Cohn? 18 19 MR. COHN: Yes. 20 THE COURT: Mr. Busenkell, good afternoon. 21 MR. BUSENKELL: Oh, yes. Good afternoon. 22 THE COURT: Good afternoon, sir. 23 MR. COHN: So, we have a legal problem and a 24 practical problem. Why don't I start off with the legal 25 problem?

Page 36 1 THE COURT: All right. 2 MR. COHN: So, as against Maryland Casualty --3 THE COURT: Yes. MR. COHN: -- the only two parties were Mr. Hutt 4 5 and Mr. Osborn, and both of them were workers. They asked 6 the Court for permission to -- well, for a declaration that 7 the asbestos PI channeling injunction did not apply to their 8 claims, and they prevailed. They got that. 9 Mr. Longosz is correct that we were not delighted 10 with the decision as it related to persons other than 11 But as it happened, Mr. Hutt and Mr. Osborn were 12 both workers and they got what they wanted. And the 13 prevailing party, as you know, it's elemental civil 14 procedure, is unable to appeal. No matter how --THE COURT: Okay. 15 16 MR. COHN: -- deleterious the decision might be to 17 their friends, their -- you know, their other co-plaintiffs, 18 other people represented by the same law firm. It's still 19 elementary civil procedure, Your Honor, that if you're the 20 prevailing party, you cannot appeal. 21 Now, a very similar decision was issued by Judge 22 Carey at the same time as to CNA, and in that case, the 23 parties that we represented lost. And so, we took that 24 appeal. So, we did what we could, Your Honor, and brought 25 that case up to the Third Circuit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COHN: So, it's simply not the case that -oh, and I'm sorry... And so, when we talk about this, Judge
Carey's order -- and I'm now just back to the Maryland
Casualty branch of things -- when we talk about that being a
final order, it is indeed a final order, Your Honor, as to
Mr. Hutt and Mr. Osborn. No one else was a party to it, and
it's therefore not a final order as to anyone. It's not
binding and enforceable against anyone. It is -- other than
the parties to that case.

Now, it's certainly an indication that as to how

Judge Carey would rule if similar issues were brought before
him, and one can assume that he's not going to change his
mind if other claimants come before him and bring the same you know and bring the same issues.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHN: But just as a matter of civil procedure, Your Honor, we could not appeal and did not appeal. And the only two parties who were the subject of that opinion prevailed against Maryland Casualty and are pursuing their claims out in Montana against Maryland Casualty. There is no final order that is enforceable against anyone else.

So, the issue then becomes what is the proper rule of law? And the proper rule of law is the issue that's been

brought in front of the Third Circuit, and that will most certainly be relevant to how the rest of these cases decided. The best way to express, Your Honor -- I mean, we set out, of course, all the arguments in our brief, but the best way to sum it up is to say that there were broad arguments that were made and there were narrow arguments.

The narrow arguments had to do with the workers' compensation policy not being with in Exhibit 5 to the Grace plan --

THE COURT: Right, right.

MR. COHN: -- and that's the argument that prevailed against Maryland Casualty. There were broader arguments as well, though, having to do with whether Section 524(g)(4) can even apply to a claim against an insurer for its own wrongdoing. It is clear, Your Honor, that claims against insurance companies to collect on an insurance policy is clearly -- clearly, those are barred by the channeling injunction in this case and may be barred under Section 524(g)(4).

But it is by no means clear, and we -- and a major portion of the argument before the Third Circuit was devoted to our contention that it is not permissible under Section 524(g)(4) for an injunction to -- for a channeling injunction to bar claims against an insurer for its own wrongdoing. Those aren't those, you know, claims against,

demands against the Debtor that are referred to in the statute. And they don't arise by reason of the provision of insurance to the Debtor in the sense that one doesn't need to plead that insurance was provided in order to have a claim against an insurer for its own misconduct.

And to understand that, Your Honor, I think we do need to speak about what the basis of the claims against Maryland Casualty is.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. COHN: So, the claims are that Maryland
Casualty supplied industrial hygienists, doctors, you know,
experts in safety, workplace safety, to Grace at the Libby
facility, and that they can do their job. And they do their
job in two respects.

One was that they discovered that there was a hazardous situation there and failed to tell the workers or anybody else. And in fact, as to Maryland Casualty, we have included in the record, there is a letter from an attorney for Maryland Casualty actually saying let's keep this under wraps because we don't want people to know, because it's going to increase our exposure as an insurance company, as an insurance company, and particularly as to workers' compensation claims. So, there's the deliberate suppression of knowledge that the insurance company had, but that the workers and other residents of Libby, Montana did not have

about the hazards of asbestos.

And the second way in which they breached their duty was to -- that they're supposed to be experts on industrial hygiene and they faced a situation where there was asbestos dust all over the place, all over the Libby facility and from the Libby facility. It was all over the town. I think Mr. Longosz referred to the whole railroad track area, you know, when the train would go barreling through town at 60 miles an hour, asbestos dust would just be -- go up into the air and just blanket the town.

So, that was how bad the situation was, Your
Honor, and yet, and yet, Maryland Casualty does not appear
to have said that the workers needed to have protective gear
or in any way be protected from the hazards of asbestos
dust. And of course, it was at its highest concentrations
inside the Libby workplace.

So, the legal question that all this presents, and the question that will need to be resolved by the courts of Montana, if we're permitted to proceed that far --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COHN: -- is who is within ambit of the foreseeable injury from that misconduct? So, clearly, the workers. I mean, obviously if you're there onsite and there's dust covering the whole workplace and its asbestos dust, and you know that people are showing lung

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1	abnormalities because you've got x-rays of the workers,
2	clearly the workers are within the foreseeable ambit of, you
3	know, who'd be injured by your breach of duty.
4	Our assertion, Your Honor, is that it was also
5	foreseeable that when a worker went home to his family,
6	walked in the door, you know, still covered with asbestos
7	dust, because part of the problem was there were no showers,
8	there were no procedures for them to emerge from the
9	facility at least, without asbestos dust all over them.
10	So, they would go home. You know, they'd hug
11	their wives and their children, and many of those came down
12	with asbestos disease. Was that foreseeable? Well, that's
13	an issue for the Montana courts. Mr. Longosz will
14	presumably argue no, but that's an issue for the Montana
15	courts to decide.
16	And similarly, with respect to the community at
17	large, if you see asbestos dust blanketing you know,
18	blanketing the community, and people are walking down the
19	street and it's in the air, and Libby is in a valley
20	THE COURT: Right.
21	MR. COHN: and the air just kind of
22	recirculates it.
23	THE COURT: Right.
24	MR. COHN: Was it foreseeable that community
25	members would be harmed by this breach of duty by Maryland

Page 42 1 Casualty? That too is a question for the Montana courts. 2 Now, I understand the argument that says that, 3 well, we were just a workers' compensation carrier and what we did when we went to the workplace to -- you know, had 4 5 only to do with our duties as a workers' compensation 6 carrier. 7 But under Montana law -- and we cited cases in the 8 Third Circuit briefing on this, and in fact, it was the 9 subject of oral argument that they showed a lot of interest 10 in -- once you undertake the duty -- and in this case it may 11 have been a duty that they undertook as workers' 12 compensation carrier, but it doesn't matter on what basis 13 that undertook the duty -- the question was, who was within 14 foreseeable ambit of harm, who would have been injured if 15 they breached that duty? 16 THE COURT: Yeah. 17 MR. COHN: So, that ultimately will be the issue. 18 I'm not -- I'm laying it out here, really, by way of 19 background because no one would suggest that that's a 20 federal issue. 21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. COHN: The federal issue is, assuming that that claim is valid under state law, is it within the 23

channeling injunction? In other words, if the way that it

arises is not because of an insurance policy, but if it

24

arises because, for one reason or another, Maryland Casualty undertook these activities and foreseeably could predict that people would be injured by a breach of those -- by the improper execution of those responsibilities, may such a claim proceed, notwithstanding the asbestos PI channeling injunction. That's the issue that will ultimately need to be decided by this Court.

Now, the question is when, and what's the orderly process for adjudication? Well, given that those issues of statutory construction which are applicable to CNA and to MCC, having to do with, you know, not the narrow issue of was the CNA workers' compensation policy listed in Exhibit 5, but the broader issue of how does -- what limits do Section 524(g)(4) place on a channeling injunction as it relates to the insurer's own misconduct. That issue is before the Third Circuit, and the Third Circuit will presumably decide it.

It is true that they could perhaps come up with narrow grounds for a decision vis-à-vis CNA. I mean, far be it from me to predict what a panel of judges as brilliant as, you know, Judge Ambro and the two others would --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHN: -- would say. But I think we're certainly going to learn something and that that something will be valuable for this Court in terms of its disposition

Page 44 1 of the claims against not just CNA, but also MCC. 2 THE COURT: When was the argument before the Third 3 Circuit, Mr. Cohn, again? MR. COHN: It was in March, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: March. Okay. 6 MR. COHN: Yeah. So, I'm told that under their 7 procedures, we actually could get a decision as early as 8 next month, but I'm kind of, you know, it's --9 THE COURT: It's possible. 10 MR. COHN: I would expect that they might take a 11 little bit longer. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. COHN: So, now let's talk about some practical 14 concerns. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. COHN: Because really, what this is all about 17 is an orderly adjudication. So, well, the first practical 18 problem I just want you to be familiar with, because it 19 really goes to this whole idea that somehow the conduct of 20 the Libby claimants' counsel has been contemptuous. Here is 21 the problem that we face. If the injunction does not apply 22 to bar these claims, the statute of limitations does -- you 23 know, does apply, and claims must be brought during the 24 limitations period. 25 So, the question is, how do you deal with that

Page 45 1 when there is a genuine issue that's been presented about 2 whether the injunction applies or does not apply? This is not the classic situation, Your Honor, where you say, well, 3 don't worry about if an injunction applies because the 4 5 limitations period is stayed during the applicability of an 6 injunction. 7 Here, it's the converse situation. It's that in 8 the situation where the injunction does not apply, we need 9 to make sure that we keep our eye on the statute of 10 limitations. 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. COHN: So, the limitations period in Montana 13 begins to run when the injury is diagnosed. So, you get a 14 diagnosis from your doctor and you have to bring suit within 15 -- I think it's three years. Three? 16 MAN 1: Yeah, three. 17 MR. COHN: Thank you. Three years thereafter. 18 And there are ways you can bring suit, but then you can sit 19 on the complaint. You don't have to serve it right away. 20 THE COURT: Which is what you did? 21 MR. COHN: Exactly. So, the idea is you draw it 22 out as long as possible, the time when -- because we don't 23 want to put Maryland Casualty to the task of responding to complaints if they are barred by the injunction. And 24 25 frankly, we don't want to ourselves litigating cases that

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1	are barred by the injunction. So, the whole idea is to
2	is when cases aren't if we don't know yet whether the
3	cases are barred by the injunction, let's put it off as long
4	as we can.
5	In the case of and the Asbestos Court, the
6	formation of the Asbestos Court, has actually very
7	conveniently provided a means to do that, because that court
8	is sequencing cases. And so, Mr. Hutt is going first
9	because we know that Mr. Hutt is allowed to proceed free of
10	the channeling injunction.
11	THE COURT: Right.
12	MR. COHN: And others wait their turn and can
13	and by then, we'll have a final decision of the
14	THE COURT: Third Circuit.
15	MR. COHN: of the Third Circuit, and you know,
16	I think, thereafter probably this Court, as it relates to
17	specific claims. So, that's the rubric in which we're
18	operating.
19	Now, Mr. Longosz did make reference to the Hunt
20	case.
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. COHN: I apologize, by the way. We didn't set
23	it up this way to have there be only one letter's difference
24	between the names of the two subject Plaintiffs here.
25	THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHN: But the Hunt case, for odd reasons, is not in the Asbestos Court. I think it's the only case that's been referred to here this afternoon that is not in the Asbestos Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COHN: And as Mr. Longosz indicates, that judge has put it on a -- you know, on a schedule to be -- to actually be tried.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHN: And I understand the practical difficulty that Mr. Longosz faces. And now, I can tell you that there has never been a motion in that court to stay the proceedings in that case. But whether there is or there isn't, the fact is that if this Court were to, on a purely practical basis, issue a temporary stay of proceedings in that case, we would not object, Your Honor, because that is a practical problem that we all face, which is a case that is going to trial at a time when we don't yet have a final order determining whether the claim can.

But as to all the other cases, Your Honor, there is no need, in terms of protecting Maryland Casualty from having to respond to cases at a time when it's not clear whether those cases can proceed. There are no other cases to which that applies. And so, therefore, there is no need at this point for -- you know, for the entry of relief by

this Court. And conversely, Your Honor, there is certainly
-- well, there are two forms of very important harm that
will take place if this Court does proceed.

One is just the waste of judicial time and resources for you to essentially try to anticipate what the Third Circuit is going to do on those issues that overlap, which are the major ones, you know, the broad issues that I described of whether Section 524(g)(4) applies.

You cannot simply apply Judge Carey's decision because Judge Carey's decision only binds the parties thereto. And so, you need to make up your own mind and write a decision, and that decision will -- you know, you could be perfectly prescient and know exactly what Judge Ambro is going to write for that panel, and yet why go through the effort? I mean, why does that make sense as a deployment of judicial resources? Why not first get guidance from the Third Circuit and then, to the extent that there are remaining issues that are open, you know, let's come back here and figure out how we're going to deal with them?

To the extent the Third Circuit is clear on what - on it, then obviously, you know, short of a, you know,
rehearing (indiscernible) or the Supreme Court, or whatever

25 THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHN: -- short of that, Your Honor, we recognize that. If we lose there, we have to dismiss those cases that the Court rules are barred by the injunction.

But not until then, Your Honor. And that leads to the second point.

Okay. It's not just a waste of judicial resources; it's the unfairness to the people that Mr.

Longosz would have you dismiss their cases. If we don't know -- if we don't know yet whether those cases can proceed or not proceed under the injunction, and we're required to dismiss them, the limitations period has run.

So, what happens if we now -- if it now turns out we prevail in the Third Circuit, and you say, well, based on that rationale, you can bring these cases -- you can bring these cases down here, or you can bring them to Montana? Is Mr. Longosz going to take the position at that point that the statute of limitations bars us from refiling those cases?

So, what justice requires, Your Honor, is that you not take any action requiring dismissal of the cases until it is finally decided that those cases are barred by the asbestos channeling injunction. And in the meantime, Your Honor, we commit, as we have in fact done in the Montana Asbestos Court, that we are not going to try to move forward on any cases where there is a dispute about whether the

Page 50 1 injunction applies. 2 So, that, I would respectfully submit, is both the 3 practical and the just outcome of the proceedings today. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Cohn. 4 5 Thank you. I understand your position. Mr. Wisler? 6 MR. LONGOSZ: Your Honor, I think I've lost my 7 voice, so if Mr. Wisler could reply for me. 8 THE COURT: That's fine. 9 MR. LONGOSZ: Thank you. 10 THE COURT: Of course. Mr. Wisler, yes, sir. 11 MR. WISLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Cohn has offered a stay --13 MR. WISLER: Right. 14 THE COURT: -- as I understand it. 15 MR. WISLER: That won't help, and I'm going to 16 explain to Your Honor why. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. WISLER: Mr. Cohn says there's two problems. 19 There's actually three. There are legal and practical 20 problems, but there's also factual issues that are 21 important. 22 You know, Mr. Cohn spent a lot of time talking to you about the theory of his claims. But it's inescapable 23 that all of those claims arise out of Grace asbestos. And 24 25 those claims are derivative claims against Grace, and that's

why there was a bankruptcy and a plan of reorganization, and a Section 524 channeling injunction. That's why we're here.

Now, was there some issue about whether -- before

Judge Carey ruled, was there some issue that could be

brought in good faith as to whether workers or non-workers

could bring these bad faith claims? Sure. And that's why

we litigated. And that's why Judge Carey ruled. But now we

know.

The second factual issue is, Your Honor -- I don't think Your Honor ought to do this; you're too busy -- but if you go back and look at the transcript from the argument in front of Judge Carey a couple years ago, you will find Mr. Cohn saying exactly the same things about theories of duty to warn workers, and towns and dust, and all of their claims. It's the same argument they're making to you again. Those are the facts.

Let me read a line from Judge Carey's opinion.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WISLER: "While I am sympathetic to the individuals that may have suffered serious injuries, the purpose of the asbestos PI trust is to ensure that there is a fund available to compensate the victims, and there is such a trust, as well as the future claimants, while also providing finality to insurers who contributed to the trust."

There's a trust with hundreds of millions of dollars, and Mr. Cohn's clients have access to those funds for their claims. In fact, as Mr. Cohn will tell you, they got multipliers for their claims as part of plan confirmation. And Maryland Casualty contributed to those funds. That's why Maryland Casualty is legally entitled to the benefit of the asbestos PI channeling injunction.

But Judge Carey's last few words are important.

There has to be finality. And we're here enforcing final orders of the Court, and that's important in bankruptcy, as Your Honor knows.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WISLER: Judge Carey's order is final. With due respect to Mr. Cohn, I'm not a civil procedure professor, but the idea that he couldn't have appealed an order that denied and dismissed two counts of his complaint, or four counts of his complaint, is nonsense. But it doesn't matter. The order is in fact final. The Third Circuit cannot reverse that order.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WISLER: The Third Circuit may, as Mr. Longosz suggested, have some dicta that could affect it. But not only can't the Third Circuit Reverse it, but Your Honor, at what point do we consider a bankruptcy court final and enforceable, when I suppose someday in a completely separate

Page 53 1 appeal, in a completely separate adversary proceeding, there 2 may some day be some dicta or words out of the Third Circuit that could affect a ruling that happened before? You see 3 that all the time. 4 5 THE COURT: It does, yes. 6 MR. WISLER: So, we're here because there are 7 final orders to enforce. And Your Honor, I don't file -- I 8 don't put my name on sanctions motions lightly. But this 9 takes us to the third piece I was telling you about, which 10 is the practical piece. 11 Since 2001, this has been a non-ending shell game. And this is not a criticism of Mr. Cohn. I don't mean it to 12 13 be personal at all. But if you look back at the history of 14 this case, it started with complaints against Maryland 15 Casualty for, among other things, aiding and abetting W.R. 16 Grace in conspiracy with W.R. Grace. And Judge Fitzgerald 17 ruled that those claims were enjoined by the injunction that 18 was in place in the case. 19 And the next move of the Libby claimants and the 20 (indiscernible) attorneys and Plaintiffs' attorneys in 21 Montana was to get rid of those counts and call it something 22 else. 23 THE COURT: Mm hmm.

MR. WISLER: And since then, we've seen claims as in Maryland Casualty's insurer, just Maryland Casualty not

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as insurer. We've seen claims for negligence. We now see claims for strict liability. The claims morph as this Court rules. As Judge Fitzgerald ruled that one thing was dead, the Plaintiffs' attorneys came up with something else that they said, well -- it reminds me of a "Saturday Night Live" skit, Your Honor. It was a person could win a million dollars if they guess the color that you thought of. And they said, "yellow", and the moderator said, "Darn, I was thinking of an off-yellow." And that's what they do. They say, well, this isn't yellow; it's off-yellow.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. WISLER: But the practical problem is, Your Honor, every time this Court rules, something new comes out of Montana. And the latest twist is -- excuse me one second -- that they filed a complaint in this court and asked for a declaratory judgment on two individuals as a test case. And they won two of their four counts of that complaint.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WISLER: And they did that as a test case.

There's no question about that. But now their position is, well, we won these two counts, so we can go ahead with everybody on these worker claims. But if Maryland Casualty comes in here and says, Your Honor, enforce Judge Carey's ruling -- they say, well, hold on, that only applies to Hutt and Osborn; I've got some new plaintiffs for you, I'm going

to file a new adversary proceeding, which they did two weeks ago. We've got new plaintiffs for you, Judge. And if Your Honor rules against them, they'll have new plaintiffs for you again, with more off-yellow, or off-orange, or off-blue, whatever the case may be. That's our practical problem.

We can't keep chasing the shell game. There are final orders in place. And if they get changed next month, or next year, or 10 years from now, that doesn't change the fact that they're being violated. And we didn't file the motion to enforce to punish people. We filed the motion to enforce so Your Honor would say orders of this Court mean something.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. WISLER: And finally, on the due process and Your Honor's point about we didn't bring a sort of class claim, or whatever it is. Your Honor, the asbestos PI channeling injunction is a form of -- it was part of a plan confirmation order. And plan confirmation orders, to the extent they have injunctions, are enforceable against the world.

Mr. Cohn doesn't argue that the asbestos PI channeling injunction isn't something applicable to all of his co-counsels' potential plaintiffs in Montana, because it is enforceable against all of them. It's a Federal Court injunction that applied all claims -- claimants who would

Page 56 1 file. So, yes, there is a -- we'll call it a clarification 2 order from Judge Carey, and only two parties were parties to 3 that because those are the only two parties that Mr. Cohn brought to this Court. But that was only a channeling 4 5 injunction -- I'm sorry, a declaratory judgment to clarify 6 an injunction that we're here to enforce. And that's the 7 asbestos PI channeling injunction. 8 And we know from Judge Carey's ruling that the 9 asbestos PI channeling injunction enjoins claims against 10 non-workers, against -- I'm sorry, by non-workers --11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. WISLER: -- against Maryland Casualty. That's 13 what we know. That's what we're here to enforce. Due 14 process, stays, everything else doesn't that. The orders 15 are final, regardless of whether they change someday or not. 16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Wisler. 17 That was helpful. Mr. Cohn, anything further from you? 18 MR. COHN: Just one brief point, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. COHN: It is simply not the case that Judge 21 Carey's decision says that non-worker claims are barred. 22 What he said is that claims are barred except to the extent 23 that they arise out of or are based upon MCC's workers' 24 compensation policies.

So, I understand that they're taking the position

that a non-worker cannot state a claim that arises out of
the workers' compensation policies. But in this case, to
the extent that Maryland Casualty undertook duties as
workers' compensation carrier, had a duty to disclose
dangers they had found in the workplace, sent the industrial
hygienist in, they should have fixed the dust problem -they didn't -- to the extent that those duties were
undertaken as a workers' compensation carrier, but others
had the right to benefit from the ambit of foreseeable harm
if those duties were breached, those people too resubmit can
bring claims.

And Judge Carey -- that was not an issue that he ruled upon. And not only that, I don't think he would have ruled upon it because, as he himself said in his decision, "Those are matters for state law. My role is to describe what the channeling injunction permits or bars. My role is not to decide whether these are valid claims under state law."

So, to the extent that anyone, a worker, or a spouse of a worker, or a community member wants to go to Montana and bring suit arising out of the workers' compensation policies, they may do so under Judge Carey's order. I didn't dwell on this the first time because Judge Carey's order doesn't apply anyway because it was just as between the parties. But when you look at what he actually

Page 58 1 said, he is not barring anybody from bringing suit arising 2 out of the MCC workers' compensation policies. 3 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cohn. MR. WISLER: Your Honor, just a dozen words. 4 5 THE COURT: You get the last word. It's your 6 motion. 7 MR. WISLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Cohn's 8 right. He didn't make that argument before. That's the 9 off-yellow that we fear that will never end. 10 THE COURT: Right. Yeah. Okay. Well, you know, 11 I'm not going to rule today. I'm obviously going to reserve 12 decision because I want to go back, I want to look at Judge 13 Carey's opinion again, and look at the arguments again. And 14 then I'll issue a ruling this promptly as I can. It's 15 clearly an important matter. 16 And you know, my sense is that the channeling 17 injunction was intended to bring some banality to disputes. 18 And what I have to determine is whether or not the claims, 19 in particular of Ms. Roberts, fall within -- without that 20 finality. And I think that's really the issue before the 21 Court, and the one that I'll have to decide, and the one 22 that I'll have to decide carefully because it obviously has 23 implications. So, I appreciate your briefing. I appreciate the 24 25 arguments. And then I'll reserve decision and decide the

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1	matter. All right. Thank you all. Thank you for good
2	arguments. Safe travel.
3	ALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: And with that, we'll stand in recess.
5	Good afternoon, everyone.
6	MR. WISLER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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1	CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing
4	transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
5	Digitally signed by Sonya Ledanski Hyde
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